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“Ni droite, ni gauche, Francais.”
-Front National Campaign Slogan, meaning “Neither right, nor left, but French.”
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INTRODUCTION
The Recent Growth of the Front National:
Although the Front National began as an outlier on the French political system’s
fringes, it is today considered a key political actor with an extremely influential agenda.
Its presidential and legislative results demonstrate a dramatic increase in voter support
(please see Graph 1 below1). In 1974, two years after the Party’s founding, Le Pen
received less than 1% of the popular vote in the presidential election’s first round and in
its first decade of existence the Front was largely seen as politically irrelevant2. Yet, FN
electoral support greatly increased in the 1980s. More specifically, in 1983 the party

Graph 1: Votes for the Front National
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saw a breakthrough in the city of Dreux’s municipal elections when Jean-Pierre Stirbois
captured 16.7% of the vote. Such a victory gave Le Pen and his followers greater

1

Additionally, see Charts 1 and 2 in Appendix
In fact, in 1981 Le Pen was not even able to secure the 500 signatures from the "grand electors" necessary
to run in the presidential election.
2
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legitimacy and a national audience. This effect was compounded in 1984 with the
Front’s attainment of 10% of the vote in European elections and in 1986 when the party
won thirty five National Assembly seats (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005). By 1988, after
receiving 14% of the popular vote in the first round of the presidential election, Le Pen
was an undeniable force in French politics.
If the 1980s saw the Front's breakthrough, then the 1990s were about the party's
endurance and quest for permanence (DeClair, 1999). In the presidential election of
1995, Jean-Marie Le Pen came in third place with 15% of the vote. The Front capitalized
on this momentum and went on to win several municipal elections3 (Davies, 1999).
Shockingly, in 2002, just twenty seven years after the party’s founding, Le Pen was the
runner up to the presidency with just under one fifth of the vote (17.79%). Via these
consistent electoral returns of about 15% of the vote from the period of 1988-2002 the
party has secured what appears to be a stable presence in French politics4.
At face value, this increase in voter support over the last twenty years is quite
surprising. After all, France is a state with a long history of democracy and
republicanism whose national motto is “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité5”. Throughout the
20th century, French voters have generally valued multiculturalism and taken
predominantly liberal positions. For instance, the Communist and Socialist Party have
had remarkably prominent roles and influenced much of the national agenda (Mcmillan,
3

For example, in 1995, Daniel Simonpieri won in Marignane with 37% of the vote and Jean-Marie Le
Chevallier won in Toulon with 37%. Additionally, in 1997, Catherine Mégret, won the municipal election
of the Vitrolles commune in the Bouches-du-Rhône department with an absolute majority of 52.48% of the
vote.
4

Similarly, in the legislative elections, after a steep rise in the early 1980s, the FN has consistently won at
least 10% of the vote. It peaked in 1997 with 14.95% in the first round and 5.7% in the second round.
5
Meaning “Liberty, equality, fraternity” where fraternity means brotherhood.
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2003). In fact, even in comparison to a country such as the United States, France is far
less conservative and far more progressive (Pierce, 2001). Yet, the Front, a radically
right wing party with authoritarian tendencies and xenophobic positions6, is achieving
consistently strong electoral returns. This is a party whose controversial leader has,
among other things, denied the occurrence of the Holocaust7 and been accused by French
newspapers of torturing Algerians (Le Monde, May 2003). How does one reconcile the
France of such thinkers as Rousseau, Weil, and Sartre, with the France of the Front
National?

What Drives Le Pen’s Success?
My thesis will identify the factors that drive Le Pen’s success. This success must
be understood in the context of French political history. The Front has united various
national right wing movements of old. This is impressive considering their diversity and
complicated historical legacies. Le Pen holds these groups together by adopting their
diverse authoritarian, nationalist, xenophobic, and traditionalist values. He is aided in
this endeavor by the sheer force of his personality. I will argue that the Front National’s
success is based on Le Pen’s ability to identify a niche in the French political landscape.
The driving factors behind filling this niche have been the FN’s protest appeal and its
anti-immigrant stances. First, Front support gives voters a way of punishing the political
establishment and therefore is a manifestation of French disillusionment with mainstream
parties. This disenchantment with political institutions reflects the recent convergence of
the traditional Right and Left. The malaise associated with the state’s governmental
6

One need only look as far as the FN’s website to see the extent of its xenophobic stances:
http://www.frontnational.com/programmeimmigration.php.
7
As recently as 2006, Le Pen called the Holocaust “a minute point in history” (Le Monde, July 2006).
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institutions is in large part due to the nation’s transition from an industrial to a postindustrial state in a more globalized century. Secondly, the party caters shamelessly to
the anti-immigrant fears of its supporters who are threatened by the vast increase in
immigrant arrivals in recent years (see Figure 1 in Appendix).

The Front National as a “Niche Party”:
The salience of the FN’s stance on immigration can be better understood in
relation to Bonnie Meguid’s contemporary work on niche parties (2005)8. She defines
niche parties as small political groups that have emerged in the last thirty years via their
emphasis on previously ignored issues such as the environment or regionalism. The
Front National can be characterized as such a party because it has systematically
constructed its political identity based predominantly on its anti-immigrant positions.
Niche Parties are different from mainstream parties9 in several significant ways (2005).
First, they reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics. Essentially this means
that they prioritize sets of issues which have been generally sidelined amidst party
competition. Secondly, niche parties raise issues that are outside the existing spheres of
political discussion. In this sense, they are able to appeal to voters across the political
spectrum10. For example, the Front National clearly emerges from a right-wing tradition
in France, yet it has also been able to capture French Communist Party voters (Baldwin8

In this article she relies on evidence from case studies in party interaction to examine the effect of
mainstream party responses to rising green and radical right party in advanced industrial Western Europe
democracies on electoral results. She specifically focuses on green and radical right party vote in 17
Western European countries from 1970 to 2000.
9

Where mainstream parties are defined as “electorally dominant actors in the center-left, center, and
center-right blocs on the Left-Right political spectrum” (Meguid, 2005). In France, this includes the
variants of existing socialist, liberal, and conservative parties. This classification explicitly excludes leftlibertarian, right-authoritarian, or right-wing, populist parties, etc.
10
For example, in Great Britain in 1989 British Conservatives moved to the Green Party (O’Neill, 1997).
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Edwards and Schain, 1994). Finally, niche parties also tend to have a fairly restrictive
platform. They bypass policy positions common to mainstream political actors and rather
focus on a designated set of concerns. This is evident in the FN’s lack of a coherent
program for the French economy.

Why is Understanding the Success of Parties Such as the Front
National Relevant?
Furthering academic understanding of niche parties is important because such
groups are increasingly prevalent in Western Europe and acquiring greater influence11.
In fact, there has been an unprecedented rise in extreme right parties, beginning in the
1970s and gaining strength and attention in the 1980s and 1990s (Kitschelt, 1995). It is
no coincidence that the last fifteen years have seen greater activity from extremist parties
in almost all the European countries, including Austria (i.e. the Austrian Freedom Party
or FPO), Belgium (Vlaams Belang), and Italy (La Liga Norte) among others. Of course,
these groups have seen varying electoral results12 and the Front National remains unique
due to itsimpressive and stable success. In this sense, the party is a worthy example for
the consideration of a general phenomenon.
The Front National must also be understood in that it represents a potentially
dangerous force in European politics and societies (Tamir-Bar-On, 2007). It
demonstrates how extremist actors can become normalized in the collective national
conscious. The Front has been one of the only parties in France to see dynamic political
11

Meguid notes that in the past thirty years, “approximately 110 niche parties have contested elections in
18 countries”. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. She adds that since 1960 over half of the green, radical right, and ethno-territorial
parties in Western Europe have held seats in their national legislatures, almost 10% of them have
participated in coalition governments, and the participation of over half of those parties was pivotal to the
formation of majority governments (2005).
12
Only 24% manage to receive as much as 5% of the national vote (Mackie and Rose, 1997).
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growth in the last ten years (DeClaire, 1999). Le Pen’s success intrinsically threatens the
electoral and governmental dominance of the traditional right and left. As will be
discussed later, in transposing Meguid’s arguments onto the strategies of established
French parties, it would appear that such actors have a tactical choice between
converging and diverging towards the Front’s positions. Therefore, the French political
system in its entirety has been affected by Le Pen’s illiberal discourse and immigration as
an issue is increasingly portrayed in line with the concerns of the Front National (Schain,
1996). For instance, to see how the FN’s basic vocabulary has infused mainstream
language, one need only look as far as Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign and
its unabashed rightist themes13.
Furthermore, the Front National’s prominence has also proved problematic for
those seeking authentic democratic discussion. It is argued that the presence of such a
radical group prevents a proper national debate on important questions from taking place
(Tribalet, 2003). After all, a great deal of time and energy is spent merely on discrediting
Lepenist discourse, at the expense of real discussion. Issues that the Front does push to
the forefront are often done in a manner that hurts the debate. Perhaps most strikingly, its
presentation of immigration leads to incoherence, oversimplification, and untruth on the
issue (Brubaker, 1996). Increasingly, Le Pen’s “droit a la difference”14 depiction of
citizenship is accepted by the public. Such distortion is not to be taken lightly as it has

13

In the Herald Tribune on June 24, 2005 Manuel Aeschlimann, the UMP’s top pollster, in describing
Sarkozy’s courtship of FN voters said, "The idea is to try to win voters who are not naturally inclined to
vote for Nicolas Sarkozy, but who will do so if he addresses their demands."
14
Herein, it is the ‘real’ French and only they who have their own right to be different, giving them the
supreme right to preserve their own ‘identity’ from unwanted admixture with immigrants.
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repercussions in the policy domain and creates a climate where racial and cultural
discrimination become more prevalent (Brubaker, 1996).
In sum, the question of the FN’s electoral success is relevant because it relates to
the conditions that give rise to extremism, and says something about party interaction and
the effect of niche parties on the general political debate. The answers in relation to this
study of the Front National may provide a better understanding of similar phenomena in a
larger context.

Organization of the Thesis:
In my first section, I will begin by laying out a history of the far right in modern
France and the influences of these ideologies on Le Pen’s party. I will argue that Le Pen
united various strands of right wing political thought and that the Front National is the
latest reincarnation of these traditions. In my second section, I will argue that the FN’s
voters are united by sentiments of disillusionment with mainstream parties and a sense of
socio-economic deprivation. They are dismayed by the extent to which the moderate
right and left have converged. This opens up space on the political landscape for actors
positioned away from the center. In response, Le Pen positions himself as the antiestablishment candidate. I will use the election of 2002 as an example and argue that the
Front’s extraordinary success that year reflects voter desire to punish the traditional left
and right. My third section will argue that Le Pen has also attracted voters by blaming
immigrants for France’s problems and making xenophobic and nationalist appeals. I will
then consider the tactics that mainstream parties may adopt in response to a niche party
like the Front. Here, I will use the presidential election of 2007 as an example of how
Sarkozy usurped Le Pen’s discourse and was thus able to marginalize the FN’s appeal.

9

THE FAR RIGHT IN MODERN FRENCH
HISTORY:
Historically, France’s right wing movements have been marked by a variety of
values. Most notably, these have included authoritarian inclinations, populism,
traditionalistic social views, and nationalist rhetoric with anti-Semitic and xenophobic
undertones. These movements generally reject universalistic and egalitarian values, and
even democratic competition. The Front National, with its exclusionary view of
citizenship, call for strong state leadership, rejection of Europeanization, and focus on
law and order, follows suite. In this section I will argue that the FN is the latest
culmination of various French far right wing traditions. Despite their distinct values, it
has combined these groups. I will argue this by laying out the extreme right wing
evolution from the Revolution of 1789 up until the FN’s foundation in 1972 and
identifying commonalities and important legacies within this transition. Such a depiction
will help to contextualize the niche in the political landscape that Le Pen has identified.

A History of the Radical Right Wing in France from
Counterrevolutionaries to Le Pen:

With the French Revolution and its promoters came the development of a counterrevolutionary rejoinder by a section of society and intellectuals who opposed
republicanism and Universalist ideas. During the Bourbon Restoration, from 1815-1830,
these counterrevolutionaries were most notably represented by the ultra-royalists, a
reactionary faction of the French parliament. They were pro-monarchy to the point of
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being given the appellation “plus royalist que le roi” (more monarchist than the king) and
they strongly opposed the constitutional monarchy headed by Louis XVIII (1815-1824)
on the grounds that it unacceptably limited sovereign power (Winock, 1995). They
ultimately hoped to restore the Ancien Régime as it had been. Due to a strongly
restricted voting suffrage15, these ultra-royalists maintained a majority in the Chamber of
Deputies and were able to be the dominant political faction during the reigns of Louis
XVIII and Charles X (1824-1830).
The 1830 July Revolution brought the Orléanist family to the throne (until 1848)
and fostered a new permutation of the ultra-royalist strand, the Légitimistes. This new
group softened their views in response to the restoration and mainly sought to phase out
the Orléans family in order to replace them with the House of Bourbon. They saw this
latter branch as comprising the true heirs to the throne. In response, the Orléans branch
countered the Légitimistes by forming their own political group, the Orléanists. This
group rejected the monarchic rule favored by their Bourbon peers while also deeply
criticizing the notion of a French Empire under the House of Bonaparte (Bonapartisme).
They considered both to be inacceptable systems of submission as they put the rights of
all men under one despotic ruler (Winock, 1995). Yet, the Orléanists also worried that
government in the hands of the masses entailed risk. They found the ideal system in the
example of the constitutional monarchy of Britain where the middle class was
represented with a parliament (Pilbeam, 2000)16. As the Orléanists ascended, the rival

15

The Constitution of September 14, 1791 called for a restricted suffrage whereupon only men, older than
25 years of age who paid a tax of a specific amount (called the “cens”) were allowed to vote. This
monetary requirement prevented a large portion of the population from voting. Then in 1795, the ruling
was altered to include those who had participated in a military campaign. In 1799, universal male suffrage
returned, only to go back to the “cens” system in 1815 (Rosanvallon, 1992).
16

They referred to this as the “juste-milieu”, a path between absolutism and liberal democracy.
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Légitimistes and their deeply royalist tendencies were increasingly politically
marginalized17 and many withdrew from active participation in the political sphere
(Changy, 2004). Both groups were weakened by their reluctance to work together and
delegitimized by their repudiation of the French Revolution (Winock, 1994)18.
Interestingly, differences exhibited between the Légitimistes and Orléanists
survive to this day. Their disagreement over the role of a monarch was essentially a
disagreement about how much power should be granted to the executive branch, and right
wing groups remain divided by this question. For example, contemporary groups such as
the Alliance Royale continue to call for the return of the monarchy19. Meanwhile, others,
such as the FN, are not royalists, yet they share a preference for a strong executive with
consolidated power. Additionally, the Légitimistes and Orléanists passed down a close
relationship with the Catholic Church. This legacy remains visible today. For instance,
the FN has a large Catholic base (Mayer, 1999) and its deeply anti-abortionist stance
reflects its Catholic values (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005).
In 1894, the Dreyfus Affair20 altered the political landscape completely. It
crystallized French political divisions that would be visible for decades to come and
made nationalism the strongest component to right wing ideology. This political scandal
with anti-Semitic overtones revolved around Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the

17

Eventually, despite remaining popular with a large (if relatively insignificant) part of the old aristocracy,
the death of the Comte de Chambord in 1883 effectively dissolved the Légitimistes as they considered him
the last surviving heir. He was offered the throne, but he refused it on the grounds that it would have been
at the head of a constitutional monarchy.
18
Even as King Louis Philippe fell in 1848, the Légitimistes and the Orléanists remained divided, unable to
agree over specific points (i.e. the declaration of divine right in justifying a monarch’s rule).
19
See the group’s website for political platforms: http://www.alliance-royale.com.
20
For an account of the entire affair, see the book The Dreyfus Affair: A Chronological History by George
Whyte.
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French military accused of treason21. Although the original charges against him were
void of any evidence, the military engendered a cover-up to justify them. They feared
withdrawing the prosecution would lead to a scandal capable of bringing down the
highest levels of the military institution (Doise, 1984). This mentality reflects French
self-consciousness and insecurity following its humiliating military defeat to Bismarck’s
Prussian forces in 1870 (Doise, 1984). Additionally, the case’s particularly anti-Semitic
nature was a popular response to recent waves of Eastern European immigration (Cahm,
1996). This recalls contemporary France’s anti-Islamic reaction in the face of increasing
North African and Middle Eastern immigrants.
The entire nation was captivated by the events that followed Dreyfus’s conviction.
In effect, the Affair brought long-simmering alternative conceptions of state and
citizenship under the national magnifying glass. Left and right-wing contingencies
opposed themselves vehemently over perceptions of justice, human rights, nationalism,
and the role of the military (Cahm, 1996). The Dreyfusards (supporters of the Officer)
tended to be socialists and republicans, while the anti-Dreyfusards were typically from
various factions of the royalists, conservatives, or proponents of the Catholic Church.
Those opposed to the officer’s cause shared a general sentiment that support of the
nation’s military institutions took precedence over any unjust treatment shown to a Jew
(Doise, 1984). Meanwhile, intellectuals, perhaps most prominently Emile Zola22, rushed
to the political fray, joined the debate, and voiced their outrage at Dreyfus’s treatment

21

A military tribunal convicted him of spying for the German empire.
The writer Émile Zola sought to expose the affair to the general public in a famously incendiary open
letter to President Félix Faure, published January 13, 1898 in the newspaper L'Aurore (The Dawn), and
given the headline "J'accuse!" (I accuse!). Zola's intent was to force his own prosecution for libel so that
the emerging facts of the Dreyfus case could be thoroughly aired. The author’s worldwide fame and
respected reputation brought international attention for Dreyfus.
22
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(Whyte, 2005). This showdown between the intellectual elite, the military, and the labor
classes who saw themselves as threatened by immigration, has parallels to today. The far
right has retained a deep dislike of the very educated (Davies, 1999). In fact, while
inactive members of the labor market and the undereducated are proportionally
overrepresented among FN voters, high level educated professionals and university
students are vastly underrepresented (Mayer, 1999).
In addition, the Dreyfus Affair accorded a monopoly over nationalist arguments
and definitions to the right. Nationalism had until quite recently been a concept
dominated by the left and associated with the ideals of revolution (Smith, 2002). Now, it
was re-appropriated by the right into a form of ethnic selectivity, blended with antiSemitism and xenophobia. It is noteworthy that the Front similarly places their
understanding of the “French” nation at the crux of their value system and strategy
(Rydgren, 2004). Finally, the liberal side’s ultimate victory in freeing Dreyfus23 served
to push the rightist movements to the fray of French politics (Cahm, 1996). They
increasingly defined themselves by their outsider status. They embraced this position and
enthusiastically rejected the mainstream society and intellectual elites who had disowned
them. If such a disavowal by their liberal counterparts, pushed far right wing groups
towards extremist positions, it also united them. After all, they shared a sense of loss and
subsequent feelings of injustice and marginalization.
The Dreyfus Affair also gave birth to new political groups on the far right. Often
anti-Semitic, with militarist, nationalist, and anti-parliamentary mentalities, they even
exhibited violent behavior. Perhaps the best example is the creation of Action Française.

23

Due to the public attention, the case was reopened in 1899 whereupon Dreyfus was reconvicted, and then
subsequently pardoned and freed. In 1906, he was fully exonerated.
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This new organization, originally mobilized in 1899 as a review in response to the
Dreyfus case, became quite strong as a political party in the early 20th century, and
endured into the 1970s (Prévotat, 2004). More specifically, Action Française exemplifies
the way old affiliations were abandoned and replaced with new associations, sometimes
creating odd couplings. In fact, Charles Maurras, the principal ideologist behind this
group, was himself agnostic, yet as head of a monarchist movement, he strategically
chose to advocate a Catholic revival (Prévotat, 2001). He saw this religious emphasis as
the necessary element for unifying the type of nation he envisioned. Similarly, many
Royalists allied with Action Française despite the fact that it had no intention of restoring
real power to a king and merely sought to use the monarch as a symbolic rallying point
towards the reformation of what it saw as a corrupt and inefficient Third Republic24
(Prévotat, 2001).
The pre-war period following the Dreyfus affair gave birth to themes prominent
among Le Pen’s major platforms today. Most notably, right wing groups increasingly
defined themselves by their opposition to “outsiders” (Tombs, 1991). For example,
Action Française was a prominent proponent of a form of nationalism which described
the nation as a pure entity which could only be kept strong by eliminating tainted external
elements. Charles Maurras himself stigmatized “internal foreigners” or what he
identified as the Catholic, white, and born in France (Weber, 1964). He entitled this
conglomerate of perceived enemies as the “anti-France” and frequently blamed the
nation’s ills on them.

24

This was not the only area where the Royalists and their new partners in A. F. differed. Additionally, in
direct contrast to the Royalists, the latter pushed for a restoration of pre-Revolutionary "liberties" to the
ancient provinces of France (replaced during the Revolution by the departmental system) and a general
decentralization.
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In the early 20th century and into the interwar years, Fascism entered the French
political culture. Yet it was never as strong in France as in Italy. Some scholars have
argued that France was protected by Fascism as its economic crisis was not as severe as
in other states (Remond, 1982). Secondly, France had a deeper democratic tradition,
which prevented it from turning towards Fascism. Finally there are those that argue that
the presence of monarchist and Catholic groups (i.e. l’Action Française) stifled interest in
fascist doctrines (Sternhell, 2000). Of course, there were a handful of groups with small
followings and even smaller audiences that overtly declared themselves Fascist25 and
acted out ideologies in line with Italian Fascism (Soucy, 1992). Perhaps, Fascism in
France would more accurately be portrayed as a propensity exhibited by certain groups
than as a concrete political movement or ideology (Rémond, 1982). Essentially, this
propensity was a function of a reaction to rising groups on the left and the economic
crisis of the 1930s. It was defined by both a more radical turn towards nationalism and
conservatism, as well as a search for a nonconformist “third way” alternative to political
elites (Soucy, 1992). These groups did exhibit the violent tendencies of their Italian
counterparts. The interwar years saw frequent military parades, street brawls,
demonstrations and riots led by far right groups, as exhibited by Action Française’s youth
organizations who frequently instigated street brawls and engaged their opponents in
scuffles (Sternhell, 2000).
Nazi Germany’s 1940 invasion of France was the exceptional event it would take
to put French Fascists in power. Extreme right groups rejoiced at the fall of the Third

25

PierreTaittinger formed the Jeunesses Patriotes in 1924, which imitated the Italian Fascist style yet
remained a more traditional authoritarian movement. Similarly, in 1933, the wealthy perfumer François
Coty founded Solidarité Française and Marcel Bucard formed Francisme, which existed thanks to subsidies
from Mussolini.
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Republic and joined the new Vichy regime en masse (Sternhell, 2000). After all, as seen
in the Dreyfus affair, their strong affiliations to the military organization ingrained them
immediately into Marshal Pétain's government over occupied France26. The new regime
declared an all encompassing "Révolution nationale" program27 aimed at "regenerating
the Nation" (Fieschi, 2004). The Vichy government’s xenophobic rhetoric was put into
tragic action as they willfully collaborated with Nazi Germany to a high degree. For
instance, the French police organized raids to capture Jews and others considered
"undesirable" (Burrin, 1995).
Such war time behavior followed by the fall of Hitler and the Vichy regime,
immensely discredited far right wing groups. They have been harshly criticized in the
collective national memory and by historical accounts. Even today they are still
associated with the collaborationist government and Hitler’s atrocities (Berezin, 2008).
This demonization solidified a mentality of isolation and rejection among them.
Interestingly, contemporary Front voters have conceptions of politics and society that are
profoundly shaped by their sense of “not belonging” (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005).
This has affected FN political strategy and led to a party tactic of cultivating marginal
identities. Le Pen’s supporters have gravitated towards his anti-establishment claims and
his refusal to apologize for morally questionable events in French history (Birnbaum,
1993). It would appear that the party has sought to provide meaning and refuge to a
family linked by the sentiment of exclusion.

26

The National Assembly voted on July 10, 1940 to grant extraordinary powers to Marshal Philippe
Pétain. He held the title of "President of the Council" instead of President of France. The Vichy Regime
ruled from July 1940 until August 1944.
27 Whose motto was Travail, Famille, Patrie ("Work, Family, Fatherland"), which replaced the Republican
motto Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.
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Although, at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the extreme right found itself
pushed to the wayside, very quickly new derivatives of the far right again emerged onto
the electoral scene. Action Française itself was dissolved in 1944 yet remnants
survived28. The most prominent of the right wing groups in the 1950s were the
Poujadistes led by Pierre Poujade, founder of l’Union de Défense de Commerçants et
Artisans (Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans). Poujade led an anti-tax
revolt by small shopkeepers and peasants and experienced brief electoral success, before
again being swept to the side by the Algerian crisis29 (Bouclier, 2006). Such small
businesspeople felt that they were suffering the most from financial reform while large
industrial groups and corporations went unscathed. Despite the brevity of Poujadism, its
mantra that the establishment cared little for the daily struggles of the everyman is still
exhibited today by the Front. It is perhaps not all that surprising that FN supporters
have conceptions of politics and society that are profoundly marked by feelings of
subjugation to other social and economic classes (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005).
Far right wing groups during this period were aided by the fact that in the 1950s
partisan identification was low due to the size and complexity of the French 4th
Republic30 (Converse and Pierce, 1986). In fact, politics during this period were
characterized by instability31. With few enduring commitments to specific parties and an
uncertain politic climate, voters gravitated towards De Gaulle’s rallying message. On

28 The party was reformed under the influence of Maurice Pujo who created the newspaper Aspects de la
France (AF) and it returned in 1947 as the counter-revolutionary movement, "la Restauration Nationale"
("National Restoration").
29 The events surrounding Algerian independence and de Gaulle’s subsequent return to power divided
them, many joined the Gaullists, and the party was eliminated.
30 Which lasted from 1946 until 1958.
31
In a comparative study done in 1989 it was found that France has experienced more high-volatility
elections in the post WWII period than any other country surveyed (Pierce, 2001).
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June 1958, de Gaulle became Premier and was given emergency powers for six months
by the National Assembly. Six months later, he was elected President of France32. The
General was Catholic and came from a militarist background, both reminiscent of antiDreyfusards characteristics, but he was not of the extreme right. In fact, his republican
and statist convictions helped create a mainstream right and its popularity marginalized
far right actors (Hauss, 1991). De Gaulle had no interest in working with Fascists or
anti-Semites, however the conservative Gaullist Party was nonetheless able to win over
many of their traditionalist and Catholic voters (Hauss, 1991). On the other hand, the
Gaullists did lose pro-French Algerian voters by calling for the withdrawal of French
citizens and thus freeing the colony. In fact, some have still never forgiven the
mainstream right for the loss of Algeria33.
The Algerian War (1954-1962) elicited controversy in France and its
politicization reunited old right wing extremists. A group of the French military opposed
to the independence of Algeria, formed a terrorist group called l’Organization de l’Armée
Secrete (OAS). Many of its members were former fascists and Action Française
members (Kauffer, 2002). Furthermore, many of its members were linked by their
activity in various anti-communist struggles and this era is seen as having fostered
influential anti-communist and anti-left stirrings on the right (Klandermans and Mayer,
2005). Clearly, there had never been much love lost between the two sides of the
political spectrum but in light of the notion that the Left’s cowardice had cost France a
piece of its territory, an even deeper antagonism set in. The left’s inability to take serious
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His party was called the Union des Démocrates pour la République (UDR) and won a comfortable
majority (78% of the vote) in November, 1958.
33 The “Pied Noirs” or former colonialist French-Algerians vote in high numbers for the FN (Mayer,
1999).
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action and truly protect the French is a point emphasized to this day by Le Pen. This is
particularly obvious in the FN’s strict approach to law and order which it juxtaposes with
its depiction of a lackadaisical and craven left34.
Charles de Gaulle’s long tenure in power35 exemplifies the tendency on the Right
towards populism and a single dominant leader. The General himself advocated the need
for strong leadership presiding over a powerful and well organized state, and believed
that a ruler need to have the will to exert strength and keep his followers in line
(Mahoney, 1996). He fully trusted in democracy yet saw the other branches as somewhat
tempering with the executive’s ability to operate. Ever since the Bonapartist referendum
on the Directory36, the right had exhibited a tendency to appeal directly to the masses for
the consolidation of executive power. Similarly, de Gaulle called for a popular
referendum to replace the Fourth Republic thus bypassing lengthy institutional change
and the consultation of other branches (Hauss, 1991).
Finally, de Gaulle was also extremely nationalist and pursued political grandeur
(Mahoney, 1996). To this day there is a certain French admiration for leaders who reflect
the role and weight of history, and speak to a national memory of French greatness

34

For instance, the Front advocates the reinstatement of the death penalty. Similarly, it has made law
enforcement a recurrent theme and demands higher sentences for practically all crimes. When in power,
the Front often allocates spending towards security services such as municipal police.
35
He was present in French politics beginning in WWII (as the leader of the resistance to the occupation)
and through his Presidencyfrom 1958 until 1968.
36 The Directoire executive (Executive Directory) was a body of 5 Directors that held executive power in
France following the Convention and preceding the Consulate (From November 2, 1795 until November
10, 1799). This was commonly known as the Directory (or Directoire) era, and constituted one of the final
stages of the French Revolution. Such a government was the republican left’s attempt to answer worries
about executive power. It was not popular. The Directory ended with the coup d’état referred to as the 18
Brumaire in which General Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory and replaced it with the
Consulate of which he was a consul. He would later declare himself First (and only) Counsel and then
Emperor.
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(Gaffney, 2004). Voters are intrigued by the myth of the hero, and politicians deploy
such conceptions into generic presidential discourse (Gaffney, 2004). Interestingly, most
fascist and radical right parties exhibit the prevalence of charismatic leadership
(Kitschelt, 1998). The Front National headed by Le Pen is such an example. He is
credible to diverse groups of voters because of his personal political skill and his party
has been greatly aided by the sheer force of his charisma. Additionally, Le Pen has
cultivated a larger than life persona for himself and often attempts to evoke the
strongman personality of de Gaulle. His provocative comments and intriguing life story,
often exaggerated by his followers, set him apart from other politicians.

Le Pen Appeals to Tendencies From This Far Right History:
The Front National has forged its identity in the context of this complex French
far right history which can be characterized by sometimes contradictory tendencies.
René Rémond, the historian and political economist, summarized such parties and
movements throughout French history by placing them within three different currents
(1982). He famously identified these groupings as; Légitimism, Orléanisme, and
Bonapartism, noting that each appeared during a particular phase of French history.
Bonapartism, is often characterized (in likeness to its namesake) by charismatic
leadership, authoritarian characteristics, and populism37. Meanwhile, Légitimism refers
to 19th century royalists who refused to accept the French Republic and the new concepts
of citizenry and nationhood that it introduced. Adherents to this “counter-revolutionary”
school of thought bemoaned the French revolution on the grounds that it would
37

Examples include Boulangisme and Gaullism headed by Georges Boulanger (1837-1891) and Charles de
Gaulle (1890-1970) respectively.
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eventually lead to catastrophe. They feared what they saw as misguided liberalism and
cited the revolution’s violent excesses as proof of coming national decline38. Finally, the
Orléanists, largely upper-middle class, were a more economically minded constituency,
and somewhat less radical. Its members prioritized the concerns of the bourgeois and
small merchants. This strand importantly initiated the liberal economic ideas of presentday conservatives.
More recently and based on a more empirical approach, Bert Klandermans and
Nonna Mayer have argued that the Front National essentially unites two different families
of the extreme right into one nationalistic, xenophobic, and authoritarian movement
(2005). Their alternative model, although quite similar to Rémond’s, describes two
distinctive rightist traditions beginning with the right that emerged in the aftermath of the
1789 revolution; a monarchist and Catholic reactionary group who rejected the spirit of
revolution and the philosophy of the enlightenment. The second grouping emerged later,
developing primarily out of the Dreyfus affair, and is characterized by nationalism,
populism, and anti-Semitism. This latter cluster is embodied by the anti-parliamentary,
fascist, and quasi-fascist groups of the 20th century.
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s own life has unfolded alongside these varied extreme right
movements prevailing in post World War II France39. He was born in a small town in
Brittany, a Northwestern region of France, to a devoutly Roman Catholic family. World
War II left a lasting effect on him, as he was orphaned in 1942 when his fisherman
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Today, although some Royalist groups remain autonomous and active, most organizations of old are
split; some remain devoted to the Bourbon dynasty, others have joined traditional Catholic movements, and
yet more have aligned with the Front National or de Villiers' Mouvement pour la France. These are small
circles but they are quite active.
39 The following information and further information can be found in Le Pen: Biographie by Gilles
Bressons and Christian Lionet.
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father's boat was blown up by a mine. He had to fend for himself and at quite a young
age, he started selling Action Française's newspaper, Aspects de la France, in the street
for spending money. Later, he enlisted in the army, joining the foreign legion, and
became an intelligence officer. Le Pen was deployed to Algeria in 1957 and for the rest
of his life would consider the loss of the French colony to be an abject failure on his
government’s part. His actual political career began when he headed the student union in
Toulouse. In 1956, he was elected to the National Assembly in Paris as a member of
Poujade's UDCA40. A year later, he became the General Secretary of the Front National
des Combattants (National Front of Combatants), a veteran's organization. In 1957 he
broke with Poujade and was re-elected to the National Assembly as a member of the
Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP) party, led by Antoine Pinay. He
gained further political experience when he directed the 1965 presidential campaign of
far-right candidate Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour41.
Michel Winock, a prominent French historian, characterizes the Front National as
the conjunction of all far-right French traditions: the counter-revolutionaries, fascists, the
pétainistes42, and OAS members (1994). In fact, scholars have found the relative
diversity of the party’s electorate to be exceptional compared to that of other extremist
parties in Europe and they hypothesize that this is perhaps due to its fusion of various
ideologies (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005). It is quite telling in terms of right wing
historical influences, that members generally see themselves as monarchist, Catholic, and
often have ties to the anti-communist right and affiliations to French Algerian networks
and communities (Kitschelt, 1998). Additionally, many FN members claim to have
40

At the age of twenty-eight, Le Pen was the youngest member of the Assembly.
Tixier-Vignancour obtained 5.19% of the votes in the first round.
42
The name given to collaborationists supporting Marshal Petain under Vichy France.
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belonged to and been active among the far right family even before 1945 (Klandermans
and Mayer, 2005). Surely, this is a reflection of Le Pen absorption of practically all the
parties of the extreme right (with the exception of neo-Nazi groups). In fact, at the
party’s founding in 1972, Le Pen chose to incorporate older generation of right wingers
into his new movement; he enlisted former O.A.S. member Jacques Bompard, and former
Collaborationist Roland Gaucher, among other relics of Vichy France, neo-nazi groups,
and Catholic fundamentalists (Davies, 1999)43.
This diversity is quite impressive considering the fact that these various far right
families (i.e. Traditionalist Catholics, royalists, neo-fascists, etc.) are fiercely
independent, sectarian, and ultimately share few ideals apart from a distrust of liberal
democracy and staunch anti-communism. It is in fact somewhat odd that such different
groups have been united under the Front National banner. For instance, Le Pen does well
among the “petit bourgeois” or the small independent craftspeople, shopkeepers and
farmers who recall the Poujadists of the past (Mayer, 1999). One might think that this
group would have different priorities than Le Pen’s other large voting bases; blue collar
workers and residual populations without employment44. The diversity of his supporters
manifests itself in Le Pen’s often contradictory positions. For example, the Front
National has oddly called for vigorous state paternalism while also endorsing free market
capitalism. At times it demands a strong welfare state to protect families in need45 and
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Additionally, in the beginning of the 1980s, various old Action Française figures, such as Georges-Paul
Wagner and Philippe Colombani joined the ranks of the FN. Similarly, in this period, royalists such as
Michel de Rostolan, Thibault de la Tocnaye and Olivier d'Ormesson joined the party, identifying it as
upholding the goals of their royalist movements.
44
This includes pensioners, homemakers, and the unemployed (Kitschelt, 1998).
45
Throughout the late 1990s Le Pen increasingly tried to depict the FN as the “party of welfare” (Davies,
1999). Additionally, in what Bourseiller describes as “calculated populism”, the FN has sought support via
its social work channels and volunteering activity among local communities (1991).
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supports protectionist policies such as tariffs on cheap imports (Bourseiller, 1991). At
other times the party rejects redistributive schemes, advocating for the reallocation of
resources through market institutions and calling for tax cuts (Kitschelt, 1998). This is
inconsistent. Of course, most politicians are not innocent of pandering to diverse
interests, yet Le Pen’s actions are more egregious. It would appear that he is
demagogically telling voters what they want to hear, when they want to hear it.
Finally, it should also be noted that over the course of its long history, portions of
the extreme wing in France have evolved towards a belated acceptance of the French
Revolution’s republican ideals. In comparing the Front to its aforementioned postRevolutionary ancestors or to today’s fervent royalists, it is of note that, unlike them, the
FN has accepted the political legacy of 1789 and now participates in the democratic
electoral process. Le Pen for all his extremist rhetoric and vehement criticisms is
essentially willing to partake in the political system’s institutions. It is this choice that
has truly allowed the FN to progress and gain power and it is a defining difference
between the Front and other far right factions (Remond, 1983)46.

Conclusion:
In sum, the FN is the latest incarnation of a historically multifaceted right. Le
Pen’s Front National reflects the legacy of a right wing that supported authoritarian
measures, embraced nationalism, rejected “outsiders”, and felt marginalized by the
political establishment. Part of the Front National’s success has been its ability to unite
these different groups under its leadership. The question that now poses itself centers on

46

This is a point of contention in academic circles. Fore xample, Pascal Perrineau disagrees and cites Le
Pen's statements against the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as clear signs of the
party’s opposition to the French Revolution (1997).
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the basis of the party’s appeal to voters. In the next section I shall describe Le Pen’s
protest appeal as the driving force behind his support.

LE PEN AND THE PROTEST VOTE
Introduction:
Numerous scholars have contributed to the debate on what drives the Front’s
electoral success. These different theories each have their merits. In this section I will
consider these arguments and argue that a driving force behind Front National support is
its protest appeal. This relates to niche party theory; as people become disaffected with
existing parties, political space for new parties opens up47. Le Pen voters generally have
sentiments of political alienation and disillusionment with established elites. They see
their participation in elections as one of the sole means left to them by which they may
express this dissatisfaction. In voting for Le Pen, they are sending a signal to the
moderate right and left. Supporting the Front is therefore a form of mainstream
punishment.

Voters Choose Extremist Parties Due to Sentiments of SocioEconomic Deprivation:
Le Pen’s audience is predominantly made up of social groups that face or at least
believe that they face difficult socio-economic conditions. Herbert Kitschelt, among
47

Rydgren argues that ideological space opens up based on political demand (i.e. the attitudes of
voters) and political supply (i.e. parties). A gap develops if the two diverge and then voters turn to
new sources of identification and representation that fill this gap (2004).
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others, explains Front National success based on the challenges that large European
social democracies face in the globalized age (1995). All of Europe has seen a period of
transformation where the rising prosperity of early postwar decades gave way to lower
growth, higher inflation and unemployment (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Additionally,
today’s economic interdependence and cross border mobility has transformed the ways in
which national leaders and institutions operate, in effect marginalizing political
organizations of old. In essence, post-industrial globalization means that the political
autonomy of the nation-state is diminished and its latitude for egalitarian redistribution
and social insurance is circumscribed (Bardhan, Bowles and Wallerstein, 2006). Thus,
Kitschelt’s school of thought makes the institutionalist argument that the welfare state is
increasingly ill-equipped to deal with contemporary challenges. As citizens grapple
amidst these dissatisfactory conditions they turn to extremist actors who offer an
alternative form of governmental representation.
Some socio-economic arguments also relate Europeanization to FN success. It is
asserted that transnational institutions have limited the capabilities of governments
(Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006). Supranational organizations such as the E.U. mean less
national autonomy in key areas of economic policy and so states’ intricate systems of
social protections cannot always survive. In response the FN offers a vision of a more
powerful France, standing up to the dangers of European Federalism48 and reclaiming its
historical independence (Davies, 1999). Additionally, it is argued that political elites
have proved incapable of guiding their citizens through the processes of change and
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The Front National was also one of several parties that backed France's 2005 rejection of the Treaty for a
European Constitution. In Le Pen's opinion, France should not join any organization that could overrule its
own national decisions.
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acclimating them to their new 21st century identities. Berezin in particular cites
numerous examples including the Amsterdam Treaty and its perceived failure in the eyes
of the French citizenry who saw themselves as inadequately consulted by the government
in regards to the treaty. She argues that as a result of Europeanization voters are left
grasping confusedly for their old identifications and thus cling to a party with such
simplistic and unabashed nationalism (2008).
Institutionalist theories note that because groups are finding themselves without
cultural or economic capital and in a situation of social decline and status deprivation,
they are increasingly disenchanted with the political organisms in charge. As a result,
voters become susceptible to extremists. This is perhaps because as voter loyalty to old
affiliations decreases, the electoral arena opens up and political resources are freed for
new actors (Rydren, 2004). Kitschelt emphasizes sentiments of powerless and argues
that popular mood depends overwhelmingly on the distribution of income, market power,
and sentiments of opportunity. He concludes that for some of the electorate, these needs
are going unanswered. The frustration of disenfranchised groups often expresses itself
via an attraction to extreme political choices and a rejection of democratic systems (BarOn, 2007). Certainly in France, voters living under conditions of real or perceived
deprivation are far more prone to vote for the Front National49 (Kitschelt, 1995). It is
noteworthy that such extreme right parties are far less present in countries where the postindustrial welfare state is not present (i.e. Greece, Spain, or Ireland).
I will use the next two sections to add to such arguments and deepen an
explanation of FN success by focusing on the French context.
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They also are more likely to hold authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes.
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Disillusionment with the Political Establishment:
The rejection of political elites correlates to perceptions of their performance and
citizen confidence in their abilities (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Unfortunately, they are
not seen to be doing very well; academics have painted a picture of spreading
disillusionment with political leaders and institutions throughout Europe (Newton and
Norris, 2000). More specifically, in France voters have become disillusioned with
political elites due to the high levels of perceived corruption. This is largely a result of
several high profile cases in recent years50. Similarly, the nation has seen a proliferation
of events leading to the indictment and incarceration of prominent politicians (Tribalat,
2003). This is significant because in terms of setting a general political impression,
French candidates are more visible to voters than parties (Converse and Pierce, 1986).
There is also the sense that these same corrupt actors are always present and in power
(Pierce, 2001). This popular perception is not so far off. France’s practice of holding
multiple offices (“cumul des mandats”) has ensured that the available political positions
are in the hands of a limited few. Although “Cumul des mandats” augments elected
officials’ status, experience, and resources, it also gives them hegemony over political
power. Interestingly, in countries characterized by patronage and clientelism, extreme
parties using political populism and anti-state messages thrive (Kitschelt, 1998).
Additionally, in the eyes of the French electorate, traditional parties have
inadequately adapted to changing voter priorities. The 1990s saw a proliferation of issues
which transcended the traditional right and left ideological categories such as the
50

There is a striking correlation between corruption and citizen confidence (Bardhan, Bowles, and
Wallerstein, 2000).
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environment or Europeanization (Berezin, 2008). Voter concerns no longer fit easily into
the obvious domain of any traditional political party or traditional party position (Hardin,
2000). Similarly, the once influential Communist party now appears outdated. This
previously dominant party of the working class was discredited by the collapse of the
Soviet Union and has been in irreversible decline for the past few decades 51 (Milner and
Parsons, 2003). In response to such concerns, Le Pen portrays himself as an alternative
to technocratic elites out of touch with reality and the needs of ordinary citizens (Davies,
1999).

Mainstream Party Ideological Convergence:
As mainstream parties grapple for political power, they go through processes of
strategic convergence in which they alternate government and join coalitions52 (Kitschelt,
1998). In France, this convergence between conventional right and left parties has left
them indistinct in the eyes of some voters. The former left-right antagonism has been
reduced to a very short spread, such as those who prefer more generous welfare programs
to those who prefer somewhat less generous programs. Such convergence hurts
mainstream party ideological credibility. For example, French voters often lament that
there is no clear difference between the economic policies of the mainstream right and
left (Berezin, 2008). This effect has only been augmented by confusing interactions at
the elite level as old parties splinter, new organizations emerge, and individuals assert

51

Please see Figure 2 in the Appendix.
A notable example is the historical movements of the European lefts towards accommodation with liberal
capitalism.
52
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themselves away from old allegiances in rapid succession53. An example would be
Sarkozy’s defection from Chirac’s RPR to form the new UMP; many voters would be
hard-pressed to name key differences between the RPR and the UMP. Furthermore,
voters who tend even to the slightest degree away from the center feel alienated by
converging mainstream policy positions. Kitschelt argues that if there is relatively little
distance between mainstream parties then niche parties see better electoral returns 54
(1998).
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Complex coalition strategies obscure electoral choices for ordinary citizens and lead to uncertainty
regarding party identification (Pierce, 2001).
54
He specifically studies right authoritarian groups in the context of electoral coalitions.
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Figure 5: Presidential Election of 2002 with Candidates and Percentage of Vote

The graph55 in Figure 3 clearly shows the extent to which the mainstream right
and left have converged on policy positions. Over the last twenty years, the right, the PS,
and the PCF, demonstrate a systematic shift towards centrist orientations. Additionally,
the graph illustrates that as mainstream party policy orientation increased in similitude,
the Front chose a more extremist direction, thus differentiating itself more. The erosion
in the dominance of the two bloc party system opened up space for political entrepreneurs
such as Le Pen (Pierce, 2001). The convergence of the established parties demonstrated
in the graph coincides with the Front National’s rising voter support in the 1980s. Such
Votes for the FN represent the manifestations of disappointment with the political system
and are a means for the electorate to punish mainstream parties. In this sense, they are
protest votes. The Front National capitalizes on such conditions by perpetually
positioning itself in direct opposition to this bloc of converged right and left56. The party
has sought to portray itself as outside of such a system and therefore implicitly superior
to it (Simmons, 1995). To drive this point home, Le Pen groups all the parties together in
his rhetoric and refuses to take sides between them (Simmons, 1995).

2002 Presidential Election as an Example:

55 The data used in making this graph comes from the Campaign Manifesto Project. This incorporates data
from various campaigns and party rhetoric from the end of World War II until 1993 (Klingemann, Volkens,
Bara, Budge, and Tanenbaum, 2001) and recently has published similar data with some new categorical
additions going up until 2002 (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, and McDonald, 2006).
56
The Front National considers this tainted "establishment", to include other political parties and most
journalists (Davies, 1999).
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The presidential election of 2002 exemplifies the consequences of French voter
disillusionment towards mainstream parties. Out of sixteen other candidates, Le Pen
advanced to the second round alongside RPR candidate Jacques Chirac by procuring
16.9% of the vote or 4.8 million voters57. Shockingly, he defeated Lionel Jospin, the
socialist candidate and an expected second round candidate, by 200,000 votes. In the
general election, Chirac beat him with 82.21% of the vote compared to his 17.79%.
In a sense, 2002 was an anomaly58. First, the Socialists were not competitive59
and proved incapable of attracting the number of votes that usually edge out the Front.
This was in large part due to the number of candidates running within the left’s ranks
which fractured its total support base. Secondly, on both sides of the political spectrum
candidates were largely viewed as uninspiring. In fact, Chirac and Jospin, the main
candidates were considered unimpressive and even blatantly disliked (Gaffney, 2004). It
should be noted that a sizeable proportion of the French simply chose not to vote and
57

For more information please see Figure 4 in the Appendix and for a visual representation see Figure 5 on
the following page.
58 As if to prove this point, such impressive results by the FN were not quite matched in the legislative
elections a few weeks later where the party failed to gain a single seat and only won 1.85% of the vote in
the 2nd round (Gaffney, 2004).
59
Additionally the PCF had been in a state of decline for a while and were seen as ideologically irrelevant
(Wilson, 2002).
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abstention was quite high60. Thirdly, the mainstream candidates were seen as
representative of all that was wrong with the political establishment. Chirac, the
ineffective leader of the RPR, had been discredited by recent scandal and his party’s
losses in the last legislative elections61. Meanwhile, Jospin was seen as a poor leader past
his prime after five unimpressive years as Prime Minister. Additionally, their
dysfunctional and competitive relationship within the unusual institutional configuration
of cohabitation62 had alienated and disillusioned many voters. A socialist and RPR dual
executive added to the impression that mainstream right and left were one and the same,
not to mention ineffectual. This arrangement played into Le Pen's arguments that the
political elite was corrupt, incompetent and that the major parties were actually one
collusive unit hoarding power. Adding to this mainstream party convergence effect was
the fact that during their campaigns both Jospin and Chirac had sought middle ground to
the extent that they did not disagree over any big issues and Le Pen was able to stand out.
The FN’s ability to be noticed was aided by the post 9/11 media’s obsessive coverage of
"l'insecurité" which amplified the importance of an area of positions which the party
heavily emphasizes.
Finally, particularities of the electoral institutions helped the Front. France's two
round presidential voting system meant that some of the electorate used their first vote to
send a message, thus voting for Le Pen as an indication of dissatisfaction while fully
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Please see Figure 5 in the Appendix.
A coalition of the Left won the Legislative Elections of April 21, 1997. Because Chirac himself had
dissolved parliament called for these elections, his reputation was hurt, and his credibility damaged (LewisBeck, 1999).
62
The French practice what Duverger called a semi-presidential system in that they have a Prime Minster
and a President (1980). In effect, the French constitution transposes a powerful presidency on to a
traditional form of parliamentary government where the President’s Prime Minister and cabinet come from
the majority in the National Assembly. Thus, for an extended period of time, the Prime Minister and the
President of the same government can be from different parties.
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planning on using their second vote towards a candidate they truly supported (Gaffney,
2004). In this sense, they voted to punish the more moderate parties, not anticipating the
real effect it would have. Support for this can be seen in the fact that Chirac so easily
beat the FN candidate in the second round. Essentially, a two round voting system for
makes the option of a Le Pen protest vote possible.

Conclusion:
In sum, in this section I considered institutionalist arguments for the Front’s
presence such as Kitschelt’s theories about underlying socio-economic problems in
European social democracies. I also examined theories such as Berezin’s which relate
the project of Europe to FN success. I then focused more specifically on France and
described disillusionment with mainstream parties as a factor leading to Front support.
This is in large part due to the convergence of the moderate right and left. The election
of 2002 demonstrates how by supporting Le Pen in the first round, French voters sought
to punish the mainstream parties. In this sense, his second place finish gives credence to
arguments that FN support is based on the party’s protest appeal. In the next section I
will add that Le Pen’s anti-immigrant stance is the other major factor in explaining Front
electoral success.

IMMIGRATION: A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND
FN SUPPORT
Introduction:
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The French make their electoral choices based on both long term forces such as
ideological positioning, which tend to be stable over time, and short term forces, such as
the attractiveness of a particular candidate or a vote in response to a contemporary issue.
Forces within the latter category are often related to sources and factors of transformation
that induce voters to depart from their historical attachments or ideological affiliations
(Pierce, 2001). In my previous section, I considered structural forces which lead to
popular disillusionment as a factor in electoral choice. Now I turn to a short term force,
rising immigration63, to explain voter choice for the FN. In this section I will consider
the arguments that assert that xenophobia has served as a catalyst for the success of Le
Pen’s anti-immigrant party. In this sense, the Front National is the quintessential niche
party that Meguid describes; a party who has identified a popular position to which the
major, more moderate, parties are not willing or able to cater without alienating their
constituents. I argue that voters have proven susceptible to this anti-immigrant position
as it promotes a return to an idealized status quo and gives them a deeper ethno-national
identity.

“Fear of the Outsider”:
As previously discussed, some political scientists have argued that FN’s revival of
fascist rhetoric and nationalist ideology is a symptom of the social democratic state‘s
transformations as it adapts to an internationalized world. They argue that in such
capitalist democracies, institutional change has led to economic crisis. In France, the
situation is not helped by domestic disenchantment with elites and the convergence of
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mainstream parties. However, there are also other arguments to explain the Front’s
success. Academics such as Paul Sniderman, consider extreme right party success to be a
response to the increasing multi-culturalization of Western European societies (2000).
After all, with the decreased costs of mobility, immigration has increased64. It is not that
such theorists disagree with the arguments discussed in my previous section; it is that
they consider immigration to be the factor that puts socio-economic worries into focus.
In other words, popular discontent with economic cleavages is fomented by rising
immigration. For example, post-industrial Western Europeans form a connection
between their observations of the simultaneous occurrences of both high unemployment
and the proliferation of immigrants. In the French case, socioeconomic restructuring and
economic downturns following the oil shocks of the 1970s altered the need that French
employers had for (legal) foreign labor65. More specifically, as economic expansion
slowed down, conflict emerged over competition within the labor force and immigrants
were portrayed as stealing jobs rightfully belonging to Frenchmen (Berstein, Rémond,
and Sirinelli, 2003). In addition, the sudden activity in policymaking to remedy such
concerns introduced a large number of inexperienced elected local officials and
administrators into important roles66. Their political interests were not restricted to
improving immigration policy and Schain argues that this rapid expansion of an
immature network of partisan actors politicized immigration (1996). The issue became a
strategic means for attracting new allies or voters and its basic facts were often distorted
64

It is estimated that of France’s 61 million citizens today, 10% are foreign born. Additionally, it is
thought that between 200,000-400,000 unauthorized immigrations are living there as well (data from the
Migration Policy Institute’s website: www.migrationpolicy.org).
65 In contrast to the immediate post war period when immigration to France had been quite encouraged by
the government (Schain, 1996,).
66 Poor policymaking is problematic as intergroup social relations hinge on the government’s capacity to
institute policies that facilitate immigrant integration (Ireland, 2004).
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in forums of discussion. Voters were repeatedly told by actors across the political
spectrum that immigration was a deep problem and the cause of many national ills.
Sniderman argues that, in addition to this scapegoating of immigrants, Europeans
are also deeply ethno-centric67. They have a high degree of antipathy and fear of “the
other”68. Such intolerant characteristics have been made more evident by rising
immigration. In fact, race and ethnicity are increasingly sources of dissatisfaction in
Europe (Pharr and Putnam, 2003). Cultural differences, particularly in France with its
emphasis on secularism, are not easily accepted and their absorption is a long process
(Jenkins, 1996). Additionally, immigration policy in France has focused primarily on
controlling migration while also demanding assimilation from those that do stay (Schain,
1990). This couplet internalized an intrinsic link between definitions of “nationality” and
the formation of immigration policy into the French conscious. It was commonly
understood that being an immigrant implied having inherently opposed tendencies to
French culture (Taguieff, 1988). Sniderman notes that countries that exhibit strains of
intolerance focused on immigrants and foreigners give rise to at least one political party
publicly committed to mobilizing public resentment against these “outsiders” (2000).
Such radical groups claim that immigrants sop up public benefits, spread disease,
promote crime, and increase unemployment.
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Sniderman argues that sentiments of intolerance reflect experiences as adults in a large society and
economy (2000). He does not deny that there is an irrational psychological root to such prejudice but he
adds that it is also engendered by the socio-economic circumstances of individuals.
68 He argues that this is based on a fear of sharing power and resources with culturally and physically
remote entities as discrepancies between actors’ interests might mean fewer returns on resources and
power.
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Figure 7: Immigration and the Le Pen Vote
% of the population that are immigrants

% that voted for Le Pen in 2002 Presidential Election

SOURCE: http://www.insee.fr

The Front National is such a party. In fact, it does best among those who most
see a tension between their interests and the increased number of immigrants in France
(Rydgren, 2004)69. The party has characterized immigrants in two ways: as illegitimate
competitors for scarce resources and as factors behind the denigration of traditional
French culture. Le Pen advances the notion that France as it once was; morally righteous,
overwhelmingly White, Christian, and safe, is no more. The party argues that this
detriment is in direct correlation to the uncontrolled arrival of immigrants who denigrate
national traditions and disrespect the system, thus tarnishing national identity70 (Davies,
1999). Unsurprisingly, the party finds some of its strongest supporters among those that
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Please see Figure 7 on the previous page.
More specifically, the FN laments the growing influence of Muslims from North Africa, West Africa,
and the Middle East.
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most see an erosion of tradition, habits, religion, and class loyalties (Pharr and Putnam,
2000).

The Front National is a Niche Party:
Bonnie Meguid would argue that the FN’s anti-immigrant stance in response to
such conditions qualifies it as a niche party (2005). It is not that Meguid disagrees with
institutional and societal explanations for the FN’s electoral gains, it is rather that she
sees these theories as stopping short of telling the full story71. By citing several cases,
Meguid notes that the aforementioned models cannot account sufficiently for the
performance of specific small parties72. Her argument is that these theories downplay the
intrinsic role that other parties play in determining a niche party’s success. Because the
salience of a specific issue is anything but fixed, party strategies matter. Meguid asserts
that, as voters take their cues from political parties, it follows that a party’s ability to
downplay or accentuate an issue can attract votes73. A party’s ownership of an issue
shapes its fortunes and its credibility in advocating policy. In this sense, issues serve as
tools for a party to maneuver within its political environment. Thus, Meguid might argue
that the Front National’s success is in large part due to its ownership of the issue of
immigration.

Mainstream Parties and Immigration:

71

For example, exogenous factors such as natural disasters or financial crises change the importance levels
of issues. Secondly studies have shown that parties can manipulate the perceived salience of issues within
the political arena (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987).
72
As shown in cross-national analyses of new party vote, both sociological and institutional approaches
stumble in the face of the numerous green and radical right parties that attract little support under propitious
circumstances and significant support under inauspicious ones (Swank and Betz, 2003).
73
In fact, issue positions are much better predictors of left or right placement than party preference
(Kitschelt, 1998).
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As the FN has increasingly politicized immigration, mainstream parties have had
to respond. Even if a party's voter base is not directly threatened by the Front’s success,
it may suffer as Le Pen’s presence transforms national dialogue and the political agenda.
After all, the Front, via its continual barrage of xenophobic discourse, has affected the
priorities of voters (Schain, 1996). Even those that continue to support other political
parties have become convinced that immigration is a top concern. For example, in 1984,
relatively few voters considered immigration to be a top priority. By 1988, a little over
five years into the Front’s rise, immigration had become a prominent concern (Schain,
1999). In fact, voters ranked it among other top priorities such as social inequality, and it
had vastly surpassed concerns about Europeanization, the environment, or corruption
(Schain, 1999)74. Indeed, what initially may appear to be an issue or party of short term
interest can nonetheless leave a long lasting impact on the content of political debate75.
The FN’s influence has meant that the mainstream right and left have had to adapt
their strategies in order to compete on the issue of immigration. Downs famously argued
that rational political actors choose policy positions to minimize the distance between
themselves, other parties, and voters (1957). It follows that if voters consider
immigration to be a priority then mainstream parties must pick up on it or face electoral
losses. Meguid refers to this as “issue ownership” and argues that parties can go so far as
to manipulate the very salience of issues. She asserts that niche party achievement
reflects mainstream parties’ ability to either marginalize or usurp a niche party's major
platforms. Compounding the importance of such strategies, features of the French
74

In fact, only unemployment held a higher spot.
Meguid points to the fact that the environment and immigration have become undoubted stalwarts on the
campaign topic list in Western Europe, despite the common disappearance or marginalization of the niche
parties that introduced them. In essence, the success of a niche party issue is distinct from a niche party's
electoral success (2005).
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political system further propel immigration related issues into the competitive arena. The
French electoral system is that of a winner-take-all. Unlike the multi-polar party systems
in other continental European countries which encourage complex coalitions across
multiple policy areas, this has led the left and right to exaggerate partisan differences.
Finally, it is possible for the issue to be used so competitively because of the relative
newness of immigration policy76 (Schain, 1996).
Meguid specifically focuses on the position mainstream parties take in reaction to
a niche party's issue or what she terms mainstream party entry. Essentially, as a niche
party introduces or reframes an issue, established moderate parties must decide whether
or not to recognize it and if they do, how they will respond and characterize their
position. A party may choose "non-action", or to deliberately ignore or dismiss an
issue. This is usually because they consider an issue too trivial or too difficult for them to
address. Such a move signals to voters that the mainstream party sees the issue as
lacking in merit. On the other hand, a party may also choose to compete with the niche
party by taking a stand on the issue. Merely in entering the fray, they do two things.
First, they assume a role in determining the issue's dimensions. Secondly, they legitimize
the relevancy of the issue, making it part of mainstream debate, and thus altering its
salience in the eyes of voters.

Accommodative vs. Adversarial Strategies:

76

It is still undeveloped terrain. In fact, no laws on immigration were passed by parliament between the
end of WWII and January 1980. Then, as macroeconomic and industrial policy ceased to be as divisive
political topics, the political left and right seized on new issues such as immigration.
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Once the mainstream party initiates competition with the niche party within a
particular issue space, Meguid argues that it faces a further choice. It may adopt an
"accommodative" or an "adversarial" strategy. In other words, it may converge towards
the niche party's position or diverge from it. An accommodative approach undermines
the exclusivity and distinctiveness of the niche's party's position. Meanwhile, an
adversarial strategy accords attention and distinctiveness to the niche party. Therefore,
Meguid advises mainstream parties to adopt strategies which give the niche party and its
position as little attention as possible. It should be noted that established parties do have
certain advantages versus a niche party. For one, they have greater legislative and
governing experience. Additionally, the mainstream party has greater access to voters
and thus may more easily publicize its issue positions and utilize brand recognition.
In France, mainstream parties are still grappling with their approaches to the issue
of immigration. Some political groups have chosen accommodative stances in order to
procure votes and divert political attention away from the FN. Accommodative actions
include the adoption of language and policies typically associated with the extreme right
(Hainsworth and Mitchell, 2000). For instance, Chirac's 1986 government tightened
immigration controls, restored random identity card checks, and even chartered a plane to
deport 1001 Malian refugees. The Left77 has taken similar action; Edith Cresson while
Socialist Prime Minister in the early 1990s enacted a Front-like policy of setting up
detention centers for those seeking asylum. Similarly, she gave the police extra stop and

77 One might assume that the mainstream left is not as vulnerable to Le Pen as the mainstream right. Yet,
as Sniderman argues, the constituency for authoritarian values is in actuality not confined to the right. This
is because the correspondence between ideological self-conception and ideological commitments is
imperfect. In other words, some of those that consider themselves politically to the left actually hold some
rightist beliefs. In particular, Sniderman finds that those handicapped by limited education are most open
to persuasion.
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search powers. In fact, socialists, communists, and trade unionists who once favored
immigrants have shown a general trend of increasingly ambivalent commitments to them
(Schain, 1996). For example, the communist party, who is particularly threatened by the
FN’s usurpation of their working class constituents78, distributed a text in the early 1990s,
called Immigration: The View of the Communists, which although condemning racism
and xenophobia, went on to relate drug, violence, and delinquency problems to
immigration (Marcus, 1995). The party issued this text as part of a general antiimmigrant campaign which tied immigrants to criminality and housing scarcity.
Mainstream parties have even gone so far as to make alliances with the FN to
secure greater power or win specific elections. The RPR and UDF have done this most
frequently and generally in municipal elections. In fact, in 1983 in Dreux (where the FN
is seen as having broken into the national spotlight) the party’s success was in large part
due to its unification with the RPR and UDF79 who feared that if divided they would lose
to their leftist rivals (Libération, 2002). Although rarer, the left has also allied itself with
the Front on several occasions. For example, in March 1973, Georges Frêche, a socialist
candidate in Montpellier's legislative elections, encouraged FN voters (whose candidate
André Troisehad been defeated in the first round) to ally with him in the second round
against a UDR candidate (Alazy, 1989)80.
Mainstream groups have also assumed an adversarial stance in response to Le
Pen. In fact, the rise of the Front has also seen a mushrooming in the number of national
and local organizations dedicated to spreading an anti-Front and pro-interracial tolerance
78

It is notable that as Le Pen's electoral results have risen, theirs have fallen tremendously (Schain, 1999).
At the time, right leaders as Bernard Stasi and Simone Veil voiced their disapproval. Yet, others, such as
Raymond Arun, argued that such an alliance was the only way to defeat the Socialists (Giespert, 2006).
80
This was odd considering Frêche had previously explicitly denounced the Front. Yet, despite the rival
UDR candidate’s substantial popularity, Frêche went on to win by about a hundred votes.
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message (Hainsworth and Mitchell, 2000). For instance, in 1990, Socialist Minister of
the interior Pierre Joxe reacted to the Islamic headscarf affair by inviting representatives
of Islamic organizations to form a policy research institution towards the advancement of
Muslim interests81 (Feldblum, 1993). Additionally, some political leaders have made a
point to denounce the Front and state their opposition to its ideologies. For example, the
major right parties have officially condemned the FN82. However, when the right does
take an adversarial stance to FN arguments, it continues to stress certain themes as to not
alienate or offend its more extremist supporters. For instance, although Chirac’s Interior
Minister, Charles Pasqua83, gave a generally positive speech at the inauguration of a new
mosque in Lyon in 1994, his praise also emphasized the importance of "moderate"
Islamic thought and the need for Muslim practices to remain compatible with French
Republican traditions (Hargreaves, 1995).
Accommodative stances can be quite challenging because of the contentious
nature of niche party platforms. The mainstream right in particular has attempted to
benefit from its relative ideological proximity to the FN84 while not actually fully
acknowledging their shared positions. This is because in overtly projecting the Front's
xenophobic elements, it runs the risk of alienating its voter base. The break up of the
UDF in the late 1990s illustrates this challenge (Hargreaves, 1995). Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing’s UDF accomplished an impressive feat in the 1970s. It rallied the nonGaullist right (i.e. economic liberals and centrist Christian democrats) and managed to
81

Called the Deliberative Council on the Future of Islam in France (CORIF), it was an institution that
would be the parallel of comparable organizations of Catholics, Protestants and Jews, by setting a unified
political agenda and working towards Muslim’s rights.
82
The RPR did so in September 1988, as did the Parti républicain in 1991. Candidates that continue to
pursue such alliances are often punished by their organizations.
83
A Gaullist politician. He was Interior Minister from 1986 to 1988.
84
In contrast to the left, the mainstream right has the inherent advantages of having a stronger pull on FN
voters simply as a result of its ideological foundations and history (Budge and Farlie, 1983).
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create a party capable of countering Chirac's RPR (Berstein, Rémond, and Sirinelli,
2003). Even more impressively, despite being plagued with factional divisions it was
able to survive the years. However, in 1998 the UDF’s incorporation of Front National
politicians into its ranks led to a crisis as various members of the party’s coalition left in
protest. This abandonment decimated the party and left it irrefutably weakened.
Mainstream parties' often deal with this challenge by paradoxically condemning the Front
in public but nonetheless adopting its discourse. It would appear that voters do not want
to see an explicit connection to groups such as the Front but they do not mind imagery
and rhetoric reminiscent of Lepenist positions. For instance, while the Republican left
publicly rejects an ethno-cultural definition of French nationality, it does call for a level
of cultural conformity that infringes upon cultural diversity (Fysh and Wolfreys, 1998).

The Presidential Election of 2007:
The Presidential election of 200785 exemplifies how the mainstream right’s86
accommodative approach was able to marginalize the Front’s niche party advantages.
The data source I used for my graph in Figure 2 does not yet have information for
elections after 2002, however I predict that future data claims would indicate the
mainstream right now diverging from the left, an action that is having the effect of
closing the niche that was so widely opened for the Front. Essentially, Nicolas
Sarkozy’s “copy” stance on the immigration issue became more attractive than the niche
party’s “original” to voters. The UMP captured portions of the Front’s voter base by
utilizing a brand of populism mixed with deep conservatism. In particular, Sarkozy won
85

86

To see election results please consider Figure 8 of the Appendix.
More specifically, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP).
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over older voters who often select their candidate based on concerns of security and law
and order. By increasing its emphasis on these matters during the campaign (See Figure
3 on the following page), the UMP usurped one of Le Pen’s primary positions. He also
captured constituencies that are more accepting of authoritarian values, such as bluecollar workers. Furthermore, he went directly after Le Pen’s strongest base87 by making
numerous visits to parts of theSouth and catering to the repatriated French Algerians
there. To such groups Sarkozy lauded France’s imperial past and appealed to
patriotism88.
Figure 3: Prevalence of Party Discourse on Law and Order in Campaign Rhetoric
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87 Please see Figure 9 in the Appendix. I have juxtaposed the regions Le Pen won in 2002 with the regions
Sarkozy won in 2007.
88 For example, he described Marshal Lyautey regime in Morocco as “enlightened colonialism”.
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In 2007’s campaign the mainstream right also emphasized nationalistic rhetoric89
and called for policies typically associated with the far right90. For example, in debates
and his campaign platforms, Sarkozy emphasized ostensibly anti-immigrant positions
such as deporting undocumented immigrants. Additionally, he frequently stressed
France’s secular republican tradition, stating a refusal to make accommodations for
Muslim practices. A recurrent theme in his speeches was an opposition to the imperative
of being “politically correct”. He frequently attacked France’s “national repentance” and
claimed that the time for apologizing for Nazi occupation and the colonial period was at
an end. Perhaps, he also gained an edge over Le Pen via his business knowledge and
entrepreneurialist experience as he was identified as the natural candidate of France’s
business leaders. After all, Le Pen’s weakness in voter’s eyes has often been his
economic incoherence.
The election of 2007 also demonstrates the precarious position of a party that relies
so heavily on one favored issue. As Meguid notes, it is uncertain that niche party
strategies can truly achieve political power while so reliant on the salience of one matter.
This makes them especially vulnerable to mainstream party tactics. The graph in Figure
2 provides a visual representation of the FN’s move towards more central policy
positions beginning in 1997. Perhaps this recent attempt to appeal to mainstream voters91
signifies the Front’s own understanding that to reap greater success; it must expand its
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For example, Sarkozy borrowed a page from the Front’s xenophobic book and said things such as “Those
who criticize France are not obliged to live here” that tapped into strains of racism and authoritarianism
(RFI, 2006).
90
Similarly, on the left, Ségolène Royal, the Socialist candidate, also emphasized French family values in a
traditionalist vein and called for stricter measures to combat insecurity. For example, she notably
suggested that juvenile delinquents be placed under military authority (Telegraph, 2007).
91

In his 2007 Presidential campaign Le Pen reached out to minorities and women with generally
unsuccessful results.
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platforms92. Thus, the party finds itself at a crossroads: to stand by Le Pen’s original
radical message might mean never attaining true political influence. Yet, a more
“centrist” strategy might compromise its uniqueness (Kitschelt, 1998). For the FN to
now become more moderate would antagonize extremist voters that want to see product
differentiation. In modifying his message, Le Pen would run the very serious political
risk of alienating his base and losing the infamous brand he has marketed himself on.
Additionally, in better defining itself, the party would reveal how loose an ideological
foundation it rests upon93. Furthermore, Le Pen’s own controversial statements prevent
him from appearing credible as a mainstream actor. After all, he has called for such
divisive things as isolating those infected with H.I.V. by placing them on a quarantined
island (New York Times, and as recently as in 2005, Le Pen claimed that the occupation
of France by Nazi Germany "was not particularly inhumane"94.
An instance that perhaps best exemplifies the debate over which direction the party
should take, is visible in the debilitating 1998 split between Le Pen and his chief
lieutenant, Bruno Mégret95. At root was a disagreement over the basic strategy of the
party; Megret, the deputy leader of the FN, wanted to make a tactical alliance with the
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Kitschelt has argued that although a niche party’s catalysts towards success are often based on a single
issue response, the party can only remain successful in the long run if it can identify a broader agenda
(1995).
93
Perhaps Rene Monzat says it best when he describes the FN as a “subversive right, devoid of real
doctrinal coherency and ready to exploit any social, cultural or political malaise in France” (1992).
94
He has also said that “the Holocaust” was a “detail” of history (“Jean Marie Le-Pen’s notorious ‘detail’
remark”, 2002).
95
In December 1998, Bruno Mégret quit the party to found what would become Le Mouvement National
Républicain. He was followed by other major FN members who shared his view that Le Pen’s provocative
behavior was limiting the party’s future. This splinter movement attracted the majority of the FN’s
departmental secretaries and city councilors who felt that in practice, Le Pen’s strategies were not giving
them the sorts of results they believed could be achieved. This divisive step led to a major reorganization
of the Front’s leadership and in effect displaced the party’s more centrist members.
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mainstream right and thus integrate the political establishment96. He thought that Le
Pen’s “extremist” positions and anti-system approach were a limitation towards obtaining
executive political positions (Hargreaves and Mitchell, 2002).

Conclusion:
In sum, like its right wing predecessors, the Front has capitalized on specific
social, economic, and political conditions to attract support. A surge in immigration,
socio-economic transformations, and the erosion in the dominance of the two bloc system
opened the way for Le Pen. His party has made serious efforts to politicize immigration
in a manner favorable to itself. In this sense, the Front National is the quintessential
niche party that Meguid describes; a party who has identified a popular position to which
the major, more moderate, parties are not willing or able to cater without alienating their
constituents. It has portrayed immigration as a threat to French ethno-nationalist identity,
as a major cause of unemployment and criminality, and as the root to the problems of the
welfare state entering a new century. This characterization increased voter support and
has meant that mainstream parties have had to strategically position themselves on issues
such as immigration as well. In fact, Sarkozy won in 2007 in large part because he was
able to marginalize the force of the Front National by making its two largest foci,
immigration and security, into his main political platforms.

CONCLUSION:
96

At the time several conservative leaders demonstrated their interest in forming alliances, generally
through regional councils.
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I have sought to explain Le Pen’s Front National’s surprising electoral success in
the last thirty years. Although founded as recently as 1972, this party has done
remarkably well for an extremist party; continually securing at least 10% of the popular
vote in presidential and legislative elections. First, I noted that the FN combines various
far right wing traditions from movements of France’s post-Revolution past. From this
complicated legacy, Le Pen has created a party characterized by a rejection of the
establishment, right-authoritarian themes, and a particularly potent brand of reactionary
nationalism. I argued that via the catalysts of nationalist and xenophobic sentiment, the
Front has mobilized a portion of the electorate in its favor by manipulating popular
dissatisfaction with the status quo. In this sense, voting for the FN is a protest vote, as
exemplified by the Presidential election of 2002, against mainstream elites and increased
immigration. Furthermore, I argued that because its anti-immigration stance is a driving
force behind the Front’s success, then it is a niche party as described by Bonnie Meguid.
Due to such characteristics, the Front’s success has depended on the way mainstream
parties react to the immigration issue and whether or not they are able to marginalize it,
or adopt it as their own. I concluded by nothing that the Front faces a difficult course in
the future. Although, it may certainly retain its most loyal base, it is increasingly
threatened by the mainstream right’s adoption of some of its rhetoric.
Looking to the future, it is unclear where the FN will be in ten or even five years.
After all, Jean-Marie Le Pen is today almost 80 years old and the Front National must
know that it will not be able to depend so thoroughly on his pugnacious and charismatic
personality for much longer. The question of who will replace him has thus far has been
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controversial97. Yet, regardless of whether the FN will eventually fade from the French
political scene, its current presence suggests that political extremists even in the most
democratic places may always achieve a degree of success. More specifically, conditions
of popular dissatisfaction, whether due to governmental failings, questions of identity, or
economic insecurity, will create an audience susceptible to radicals. The electoral
achievements of the FN suggest that this is because such actors represent a form of
protest for the electorate. Liberal democracies must be continually wary of these
extremist groups as they pose a very real threat. For proof, one need only consider the
manner in which Le Pen’s extremist agenda affects the entire political climate of
contemporary France, going so far as to influence government policy.
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In 2003, Le Pen chose his daughter, Marine Le Pen, as the new executive of the party which led to
contestation within the party, as other big FN players questioned this choice. Party insiders felt that such
an undertaking was inappropriate and feared a possible family dynasty with no room for other power
players (Simons, 2006).
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APPENDIX
Chart 1:
French Presidential Election Results
Election
year

# of 1st round
votes

% of 1st round
vote

# of 2nd round
votes

% of 2nd round
vote

1974

190,921

0.80%

—

—

1981

—

—

—
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1988

4,376,742

14.50%

—

—

1995

4,571,138

15.00%

—

—

2002

4,805,307

16.86%

5,525,906

17.79%

2007

3,835,029

10.44%

—

—

Chart 2:
French National Assembly Election Results
Election year

1978
1981
1986
1988
1993
1997
2002
2007
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0
1

2,862,960

11.30%

393,205

1.85%

0

1,116,005

4.29%

17,107

0.08%

0
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Figure 2: Communist Party Voter Loss

Source: http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMParti?codePays=FRA&codeParti=pcf
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Figure 4: Summary of the 21 April and 5 May 2002 French presidential election
results

Candidates

Nominating parties

Jacques Chirac

Rassemblement pour la
République

Jean-Marie Le
Pen

Front national

Lionel Jospin

Parti Socialiste

François
Bayrou

Union pour la démocratie
française

Arlette Laguiller

Lutte ouvrière

Jean-Pierre
Chevènement

Mouvement des citoyens

Noël Mamère

Les verts

Olivier
Besancenot
Jean SaintJosse

Ligue communiste
révolutionnaire
Chasse, pêche, nature,
traditions)

Alain Madelin

Démocratie libérale

Robert Hue

Parti communiste français
Mouvement national
républicain

Bruno Mégret
Christiane
Taubira
Corinne Lepage
Christine Boutin
Daniel
Gluckstein
Total (turnout
71.6 %)

Parti radical de gauche
Citoyenneté action
participation pour le XXIe
siècle
Forum des républicains
sociaux
Parti des travailleurs

Votes 1st
round

%

5,665,85
5
4,804,71
3
4,610,11
3
1,949,17
0
1,630,04
5
1,518,52
8
1,495,72
4
1,210,56
2
1,204,68
9
1,113,48
4
960,480

19.88
%
16.86
%
16.18
%

3.37%

667,026

2.34%

660,447

2.32%

535,837

1.88%

339,112

1.19%

132,686

0.47%

28,498,4
71

10000.
00%

Votes
2nd
round
25,537,95
6
5,525,032

%
82.2
1%
17.7
9%

6.84%
5.72%
5.33%
5.25%
4.25%
4.23%
3.91%

31,062,98
8
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FIGURE 6: 2002 Presidential Election Voting Trends
First Round (April
21st, 2002)

Second Round (May
5th, 2002)

Registered Voters

41,191,169

41,191,169

Actual Voters

29,495,733 (71.6%)

Blank Votes

1,768,307 (5.99%)

1,768,307 (5.39%)

Abstention

11,698,956 (28.4%)

8,357,688 (20.29%)

32,832,295 (79.9%)

Source: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/dossier/presidentielles/2002\

Votes

Abstentions
Blank Vote
Jean-Marie Le Pen
Jacques Chirac
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Figure 8: Summary of the 22 April and 6 May 2007 French presidential election results
Candidates – Parties
1st round
2nd round
Votes
%
Votes
%
Nicolas Sarkozy
Union pour un mouvement populaire 11,448,663 31.18% 18,983,138 53.06%
Ségolène Royal
Parti socialiste
9,500,112 25.87% 16,790,440 46.94%
François Bayrou
Union pour la démocratie française
6,820,119 18.57%
Jean-Marie Le Pen
Front national
3,834,530 10.44%
Olivier Besancenot
Ligue communiste révolutionnaire
1,498,581 4.08%
Philippe de Villiers
Mouvement pour la France
818,407
2.23%
Marie-George Buffet
Popular and anti-liberal Left
707,268
1.93%
Dominique Voynet
Les Verts
576,666
1.57%
Arlette Laguiller
Lutte ouvrière
487,857
1.33%
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Chart 4: In 2007 Sarkozy Takes Le Pen’s 2002 Voting Strongholds
2002

2007

Jacques Chirac
Jean-Marie Le Pen
Lionel Jospin

Nicolas Sarkozy
Ségolène Royale
François Bayrou
Source:
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